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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASEIPROCEDURAL mSTORY
On March 19,2009, a Default Judgment was entered against the Defendant, Carol Blazier-

Henry, in the amount of $72,667.25 in favor of Plaintiffs, Leon Phillips and Earline Chance.
On April 22, 2009, the recorded Default Judgment and a Writ of Execution in the amount of
$87,211.07 were sent to the Bonner County Sheriff's Department, with a request that the real
property (described in the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale attached hereto and incorporated herein as
Exhibit "A") be levied upon and sold. A Sheriff's sale was set for June 2, 2009, at 10:00 a.m.
On June 2, 2009, the Bonner County Sheriff's Department conducted the sale. Neither
Plaintiffs nor Plaintiffs' counsel appeared at the Sheriff's Sale, nor did the Plaintiff submit a written
creditor's bid. After a 15 minute delay to allow for late arrival of other bidders, the Sheriff
properly called the sale and the real property was sold to the highest bidder, the Appellant, Roy
Jacobson, ("Jacobson") for the amount of$I,OOO.OO.
Shortly after the sale, the Sheriff advised Plaintiff's counsel of the sale. Counsel objected
claiming that she assumed or expected the Sheriff to announce a credit bid at the sale. The Sheriff
responded that a written credit bid must be submitted in advance or submitted in person, or by
representative, at the sale.
On November 17, 2009, the Plaintiffs' counsel, together with the Bonner County
Prosecuting Attorney's Office, Civil Counsel, Scott Bauer, entered into a Stipulation to Set Aside
Sheriff's Sale. The Appellant, Roy Jacobson, purchaser of the real property at Sheriff's Sale, was
neither notified nor given an opportunity to be heard prior to the Court's entry of the Order to Set
Aside Sheriff's Sale. Mr. Jacobson received the Order in early December, 2009.

The property is less than twenty (20) acres and therefore the period for redemption of the
real property lapsed on or about December 2, 2009.
The Appellant, Roy Jacobson, is entitled to a Sheriff's Deed of the real property he legally
purchased for the sum of$I,OOO.OO on June 2, 2009.
On December 30, 2009, the Appellant, Roy Jacobson, filed an Exparte Motion to Quash
Order to Set Aside Sheriff's Sale and an Affidavit.
On January 5, 2010, the Court entered an Ex Parte Order Quashing Order to Set Aside
Sheriff's Sale.
On January 19,2010, Arthur M. Bistline substituted as counsel for the Plaintiffs in the place
and stead of Plaintiff's Counsel, Fonda L. Jovick.
On April 16,2010, Jacobson filed a Motion to Issue Sheriff's Deed, Affidavit of Counsel
and Affidavit of Roy Jacobson and set the matter for hearing on May 19, 2010.
On April 21, 2010, Plaintiffs through their new counsel, Arthur Bistline, filed a Motion to
Set Aside Sheriff Sale or Extend Redemption Period, Memorandum in Support of said Motion,
Affidavit of Earline Chance.
On April 30, 2010, the Appellant herein filed his Brief in Response to Plaintiffs' Motion Set
Aside Sheriff's Sale.
At hearing on May 19, 2010, the Court ordered on the record that the Sheriffs Sale be set
aside and that the Plaintiffs were responsible for attorneys' fees and costs, as well as the Jacobson's
principal, interest and lost business opportunities. Plaintiff's counsel prepared an Order, without
notice to counsel, and submitted to the Court a proposed Order Re: Motion to set Aside Sheriff's
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Sale, which was entered by the Court on May 19,2010, but which failed to include the language set
forth by the Court on the record as set forth above.
On May 27, 2010, counsel for the Appellant herein filed a Motion to Amend Order RE:
Motion to Set Aside Sheriff's Sale and to Certify Pursuant to Rule 54(b).
On May 27, 2010, counsel the Appellant herein filed a Motion to Reconsider or to
Alter/Amend Judgment/Order, Affidavit of Roy Jacobson, Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs,
Memorandum of Fees and Costs and notice the matter for hearing on October 6,2010.
On July 7, 2010, an Order and Judgment were entered in favor of Roy Jacobson, the Third
Party PurchaserlIntervenor against the Plaintiffs in the sum of$2,708.61.
At hearing on October 6, 2010, the matter was heard and the Court requested additional
briefing be filed by the parties.
On October 6,2010, the Court entered an Order Re Intervenor to reflect the case heading be
modified to include Roy Jacobson as a Third Party PurchaserlIntervenor.
On October 20, 2010, counsel for the Plaintiffs filed their pleading entitled "Additional
Briefmg" and an Affidavit of Arthur M. Bistline.

On November 3, 2010, counsel for the

Jacobson filed his Reply Brief.
On January 18,2011, the Court entered its Memorandum Decision denying Mr. Jacobson's
Motion to Reconsider Order setting aside Sheriff's Sale and granting Mr. Jacobson's Motion to
Amend the Order to reflect that Mr. Jacobson is entitled to all of the money he paid towards
purchase of the property, taxes, etc., as well as attorneys' fees and costs, plus any lost profit or
business opportunities, and accrued interest.
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On February 9, 2011 a Final Judgment and Rule 54(b) Certificate was entered with the
above fmdings. On March 16,2011, the undersigned timely filed his Notice of Appeal. The issue
raised in the Notice of Appeal is the propriety of the Trial Court's decision to set aside the Sheriff's
sale based solely on a finding that Mr. Jacobson's purchase at the sale of $1000.00 is so inadequate
as to "shock the conscience" of the Court.
On April 6, 2011, the Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Cross-Appeal.

The Plaintiffs' Cross-

Appeal apparently argues that the Court erred by not fmding "other circumstances" or irregularities
supporting the decision to set aside the sheriff's sale.
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II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A.

The Trial Court Erred by Adopting a "Shock the Conscience" Standard where
Idaho Case law has not adopted such standard.

B.

The Trial Court Erred in its Finding that the Third Party Purchaser
Jacobson's Bid Price of $1,000.00 was so Grossly Inadequate as to Shock the
Court's Conscience in Relationship to the "Fair Market Value" of $99,000.00.

C.

The Trial Court Erred in Granting Plaintiffs' Equitable Relief When Plaintiffs
had Adequate Remedies at Law.

D.

Policy Considerations Require the Court Reverse the Trial Court's
Memorandum Decision.

E.

Jacobson is Entitled to Attorneys' Fees and Costs on Appeal.
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III.

ARGUMENT
A.

The Trial Court Erred by Adopting a "Shock the Conscience" Standard where
Idaho Case law has not adopted such standard.

Over the past century, the Idaho Courts have consistently held that the equitable relief of
setting aside a sheriff's sale is only available when the sale was for inadequate consideration and
other circumstances exist that justifY setting aside the sale. The degree to which the consideration is
lacking may reduce the need for a showing of other circumstances to that of "slight" circumstance,
but a showing must still be made.
For example, the case law is clear that where the sheriff fails to comply with the correct
procedure, the District Court is correct in setting aside the sale. Fulton v. Duro, 107 Idaho 240, 687
P.2d 1367 (App.1984). The U.S. Supreme Court has held that failure to provide "actual notice of
the sale" constitutes an unconstitutional deprivation of property without due process of law and
supports setting aside of Sheriff's Sale. Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 103
S.Ct. 2706, 77 L.Ed. 2d, 180 (1983); quoted in Tudor Engineering v. Mouw, 109 Idaho 573, 709
P.2d 146 (1985).
Further, the Court may act in equity where there exists between the parties fraud, mistake or
other circumstances appealing to the Court's equitable jurisdiction, to deprive a purchaser or party
with unclean hands from benefitting from his wrongful conduct. Steinour v. Oakley State Bank, 45

Idaho 472, 262 P. 1052 (1928) [where bank/creditor representative promised debtor that bank
would extend time for redemption].
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Finally, the Court has recognized "other circumstances" where the defendant/debtor was
determined legally incompetent from prior to filing of the debt collection action through the time of
sheriff's sale. Southern Idaho Production Credit v. Ruiz, 105 Idaho 140,666 P.2d 1151 (1983).
On the other hand, the Idaho case law does not support setting aside the sale where the
purchaser comes to the Court with clean hands and none of the "other circumstances" illustrated
above exist. Counsel is unaware of any case in Idaho allowing the setting aside of a sale based
upon the mere mistake or oversight of the moving party.
In the Trial Court's Memorandum Decision on Jacobson's Motion to Intervene, the Court
made two (2) significant fmdings: First, the Court found that the record did not reveal even "very
slight circumstances" to accompany a fmding of gross inadequacy of price and therefore fulfill the
requirements of the Idaho Supreme Court Decision in Gaskill v. Neal. Second, the Court found that
the disparity between the Noonan Appraisal ofthe real property and Jacobson's $1,000.00 sale bid
was so "grossly inadequate so as to shock" the court's judicial conscience justifying the decision to
set aside the Sheriff's sale. (R.p.170)
The Trial Court's Decision relied entirely upon the case of Fiolle v. First National Bank of
Thomas, 173 Okla. 501,49 P.2d 145 (Okla.1935). The Court determined that this was a matter of
first impression, but because the Idaho Supreme Court had relied upon Fiolle in its ruling in Gaskill
v. Neal, 77 Idaho 428, 293 P.2d 957 (1956), it was appropriate for the Trial Court in this matter to
further extend Fiolle and adopta standard that a Sheriff's sale may be set aside where the sale price
"shocks the conscience" of the court even where no other circumstances exist to justify setting it
aside. This "standard" is never defined by the Trial Court, except to use the analogy of granting a
new trial notwithstanding a jury verdict.
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The Court declined to grant Jacobson's Motion to Reconsider and found that the Jacobson
purchase price of $1,000.00 so grossly inadequate in comparison to the Noonan Appraisal of
$99,000.00, as to shock the Court's conscience justifYing the setting aside of the Sheriff's Sale.
This ruling is in error for the reasons that follow.
The Fiolle decision is quoted as follows:
On a motion to confIrm a sale, the court should carefully examine
the officer's proceedings and, if in conformity to the statutes in such
cases made and provided and there are no other conditions, should
confIrm the sale. Mere inadequacy of price bid is not of itself a
sufficient cause of setting aside a sale in the absence of fraud or
irregularity or other causes appealing to the equitable jurisdiction of
the court, but all of the authorities hold uniformly that gross
inadequacy of consideration, coupled with very slight additional
circumstances, is sufficient to set aside such sale, and that where the
consideration is so grossly inadequate as to shock the conscience of
the court, it is alone sufficient.
Fiolle v. First National Bank, 173 Okla. 501,
49 P.2d 145, 146 (Okla.l935)[italics added]
The Trial Court erred to consider two (2) factors in adopting the latter portion of Fiolle
decision quoted above.
First, the Piolle Court's decision not to confIrm the sale is distinguished from this case as
the decision was justifIed by other circumstances. The opinion reflects that the Fiolle sale was
called at 2:00 p.m. whereupon the third-party purchaser issued a bid of $26.00. Approximately,
two (2) minutes or twenty (20) minutes later (the evidence was in conflict), the creditorlbank's legal
counsel appeared, explained his delay was caused by traffic detour, and offered a bid of $500.00 on
behalf of the bank. The Sheriff's Deputy conducting the sale refused the credit bid, even though
offered just minutes after the 2:00 p.m. sale time. The evidence also reflected that the Sheriff's
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Deputy conducting the sale (Miller) was not knowledgeable as to the ordinary custom and practice
of the Sheriff conducting these sales and believed it to be his legal obligation to accept only the
third-party purchaser's bid offered at the time the sale was called. The Fiolle Trial Court refused to
confirm the third-party purchaser's bid.

In ruling to affirm the Trial Court, the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated that a party may set
aside a sale whenever the property is not sold for fair price and there has been "some other
misconduct, or irregularity, injurious to the sale; or (4) the purchaser has been guilty of some
misconduct tending to diminish the price, or discourage bidding; or (5) others have been guilty of
combinations, or other acts injuriously affecting the sale; or (6) the weather was so exceeding
inclimate or the water so high or in some other way bidders were prevented or deterred from
attending the sale; or (7) for some other reason not the fault ofthe party complaining a fair sale

was not had." Fiolle, 49 P.2d at 146. [italics added]
It was noted by the Fiolle court that counsel for the creditor's bid was delayed in arriving at
the sale to offer his bid due to "a bad detour in route to the place of sale". Fiolle, 49 P.2d at 145.

In the instant case, the Record is undisputed that the Bonner County Sheriff delayed calling
of the sale for more than fifteen (15) minutes and did so with the consent and agreement of Mr.
Jacobson, the third-party purchaser. (Clerk's Certificate of Exhibit No.3; Affidavit of Roy
Jacobson dated December 30, 2009). Plaintiffs never appeared at the sale and by their prior
Counsel's affidavits did not believe they were required to appear at the sale or submit a bid.
Second,the Trial Court in this matter erred in its adoption and application of the language
of the "shocking the conscience" standard from Fiolle as that standard does not appear to be the law
in Idaho, and may not be good law in the state of Oklahoma.
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Idaho law on this subject is clear that other circumstances must exist in addition to an
inadequate sale price. In Oklahoma case law, the Fiolle case was decided upon inadequate sale
price and other circumstances discussed above. Although the Court included language regarding
the "shocking the conscience" standard, it appears to never have been applied.
Two (2) years after Fiolle, the Trial Court in Sharp v. Elseg, 180 Okla. 201, 69 P.2d 55
(Okla. 1937) refused to confirm a sale fInding that although no irregularities in the sale existed, the
sale price of$1,200.00 for 80 acres was grossly inadequate and shocked the Trial Court's
conscience. On appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court found for the plaintiff and reversed the Trial
Court and remanded with the directions to confIrm the sale, despite the defendant's argument that
the Fiolle decision supported the trial court's Order Refusing to Confirm the Sale.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Sharp v. Elseg, stated as follows:
Gross inadequacy is quite generally, if not always, accompanied by
some circumstance, however slight, to warrant a refusal of
confirmation, but in the case at bar, there is no slight circumstance.
On the other hand, the court found that there was no irregularity and
that the sole and only respect in which the same was unfair was in
the inadequacy of the price bid at said sale. No case has been called
to our attention, nor has one been examined by us, in which the
parties were present at the sale, or had an opportunity to be present,
in which the Appellate Court sustained the action of the trial court
where it refused to confirm the sale solely on the grounds of
inadequacy ofthe bid.....
Sharp v. Elseg, 180 Okla. 201, _ _
69 P.2d 55,56 (Okla. 1937)[italics added]
The takeaway from the .sharp decision two (2) years subsequent to Fiolle is that the
Oklahoma Supreme Court cannot imagine a circumstance in which it would set aside a sale simply
because of inadequate price, where no other circumstances exists.
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Further on, the ~ Court stated: "We do not announce the rule that there cannot arise a
case where gross inadequacy standing alone will not warrant a refusal to confmn. We believe the
rule in State v. Harrower, supra and the above authority sufficient to cover every contingency in that
respect that might arise." Id.

In short, the prior line of Oklahoma decisions (similar to Idaho's)

always shows some other circumstance supporting a decision to set aside the sale.
Further, the Oklahoma Supreme Court notes that the various circumstances, misconduct,
irregularity, weather or natural events interfering with bidding, etc., are sufficient to cover every
contingency that might arise justifYing setting aside of the sale. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
further noted that gross inadequacy is generally, if not always, accompanied by one (1) of these
other circumstances justifying a decision to set aside the sale.
In this case, the Trial Court found no other circumstances, not even "very slight"

circumstances, exist to justify setting aside the sale. Idaho law is unequivocal and does not follow
the "inadequate consideration alone" standard. If that were true, then every sheriff s sale would be
vulnerable to attack requiring the Court to weigh the various valuations and equities of the
circumstances. This "shock the conscience" standard fashioned by the Trial Court will insert a high
degree of uncertainty into sheriff s sales.
The Trial Court crafted a new rule of law in Idaho, from what appears, in light of
subsequent Oklahoma cases, to be hypothetical dicta in Fiolle. Of note, no decision from any court
was cited by the Trial Court wherein the "shocking the conscience" standard alone justified setting
aside a sheriff s sale.
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Additionally, the new "standard" announced by the trial Court in this matter, is without
defInition sufficient to allow consistent application. When does a bid "shock" the conscience
sufficiently to undo the permanency of a sheriff's sale?
The Trial Court committed error in adopting this standard, and this Court is asked to reverse
and remand with instructions to deny Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside and to confIrm Roy
Jacobson's purchase of the real property.
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B.

The Trial Court Erred in Finding that Jacobson's Sheriff Sale Bid of $1,000.00
was so Grossly Inadequate as to Shock the Court's Conscience in Relationship
to the "Fair Market Value" of $99,000.00.

For the reasons set forth below, the Trial Court misapplied the Noonan appraisal of
$99,000.00 as a "fair market value" under the circumstances of a Sheriff's Sale. Mr. Noonan's
appraisal opines that the property in question had a value of $99,000.00 on the date of sale, June 2,
2009, and defines "fair market value" as:
The most probable price which a property should bring in a
competitive and open market under all conditions requisite to a fair
sale, the buyer and seller, each acting prudently, knowledgeably and
assuming the price is not affected by undue stimulus. Implicit in this
definition is the consummation of a sale as of a specified date and
the passing of title from seller to buyer under conditions whereby:
(1) buyer and seller are typically motivated; (2) both parties are well
informed or well advised and each acting in what he considers his
own best interests; (3) a reasonable time is allowed for exposure in
the open market; (4) payment is made in terms of cash in U.S.
Dollars or in terms of financial arrangements comparable thereto;
and (5) the price represents the normal consideration for the property
sold unaffected by special or creative fmancing or sales concessions
granted by anyone associated with the sale.
Affidavit of David Noonan,
attached Appraisal p. 10

Pursuant to case law, this is not the defmition of fair value to be achieved at a Sheriff's Sale.
A fair sheriff's sale price would be a price within a range of prices a
neutral person would be willing to pay, at a forced sale, for property
conveyed, not by warranty deed, but rather by a sheriff's deed,
subject to known and unknown encumbrances, assessments and
potential liens with an uncertain quality or condition of any existing
structures; with potential latent problems and unknown liability;
considering the amount a person would need to invest in necessary
repairs or cleanup; with risk of legal process and expense to secure
possession or clear title; and with uncertainty of potential concealed
environmental hazards. In short, the price at a fair sheriff's sale
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would be a price in the range a neutral outsider under no constraint
to buy would reasonably be willing to risk paying at a forced sale
conducted by open bidding. Property sold at a sheriff s sale will not
normally sell for a price approaching its fair market value. Always
to be considered is the underlying need for judicial sales to be fmal.
Sisk v. McIlroy & Associates, 934 S. W. 2d 567, 570-1
(Mo. App., Div. 1, 1996); quoting, Yakley v. Wian, 877 S. W.2d 179,
182,183 (Mo. App.W.D. 1994)
It was, therefore, error for the Trial Court to simply compare the Noonan fair market value

of $99,000.00 as against Mr. Jacobson's Sheriff's bid of $1,000.00. Mr. Jacobson attested that the
property's condition was poor and that he purchased the property at the Sheriff's Sale realizing that
it was occupied with a tenant or squatter and would require extensive expenditures to clean up and
remove the squatter and squatter's shack and other debris on the property so as to make it
susceptible to improvement and use. (See Affidavit of Roy Jacobson dated May 27,2010; Clerk's
Certificate of Exhibits No. 12)
This Court should reverse the Trial Court's finding that Mr. Jacobson's purchase of the
property for $1,000.00 was so grossly inadequate as to shock the court's conscience when
compared to the Noonan appraised value of $99,000.00 as fair market value is defmed by Noonan.
Such a fmding is not supported by the evidence or case law. This Court is asked to reverse the Trial
Court and remand with instructions directing the Trial Court to enter Judgment in favor of
Appellant, Jacobson.
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C.

The Trial Court Erred in Granting Plaintiffs' Equitable Relief When Plaintiffs
had Adequate Remedies at Law and Plaintiff has Unclean Hands.

The relief sought by Plaintiffs, and granted by the Court, of setting aside the Sheriff's Sale,
is an equitable remedy. See: Chavez v. Barrus, 146 Idaho 212, 192 P.3d 1036 (2008); Steinour v.
Oakley State Bank, 45 Idaho 472, 262 P. 1052 (1928); Gaskill v. Neal, 77 Idaho 428, 293 P.2d 957
(1956); Wooddy v. Jameson, 5 Idaho 466,50 P. 1008 (1897).
"Equitable claims will not be considered when an adequate legal remedy is available." Iron
Eagle Development, LLC v. Quality Design Systems, Inc. , 138 Idaho 487, 492, 65 P.3d 509, 514
(2002).
Where a remedy that is adequate, certain and complete exists at law, the courts have
consistently held that no equitable remedy will lie. County of Ada v. Bullenbridge Company, 5
Idaho 79 (1896); Beem v. Davis, 31 Idaho 730, 175 P. 959 (1918); Silver Bull, Inc. v. Equity
Metals, Inc., 93 Idaho 487, 464 P.2d 926 (1970).
This issue was briefed and argued to the Trial Court on Jacobson's Motion to Reconsider.
The Trial Court, in its Memorandum Decision, made no fmdings as to why it chose to disregard
Plaintiffs' obvious remedies at law and instead favored the Plaintiffs with the equitable remedy of
setting aside the Default Judgment.
In a strikingly similar case, the Wyoming Supreme Court reversed a trial court's order
setting aside a sheriff's sale where the plaintiff creditor's legal counsel forgot or failed to
communicate and cancel the sheriff's sale on the appointed day.
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As the Wyoming Supreme Court noted, "As an initial matter, one of the basic tenants of
equity is that equitable remedies depend upon a showing by the claimant of clean hands". McNeil
Family Trust v. Centura Bank, 60 P.3d 1277, 1284 (Wyoming 2003).
The Wyoming Court in Centura noted that the original mistake was caused by Centura and
the litigation that ensued was a result of the creditor's mistake. In so finding, the Court noted that
Centura did not come to the court with clean hands in its request of equitable relief in the form of
setting aside the sheriff's sale.
Further, the Wyoming Court noted that equitable relief could not be invoked by the creditor
since adequate remedies at law existed in favor of the creditor, Centura Bank. The Wyoming Court
noted that it was "obvious" that Centura Bank could have purchased the sheriff's certificate or
certificate of purchase from the McNeil Trust or acquired the right of redemption and thereafter
sought a recoupment of any losses it might have incurred through action against its legal counsel.
McNeil, 60 P.3d at 1285.
In the instant case, the facts are nearly identical. Plaintiff Chance instigated the current

circumstance by setting the matter for Sheriff's Sale on June 2, 2009, and then failing to appear or
lodge with the Sheriff a creditor's bid. Rather than immediately taking action to set aside the
Sheriff's Sale to Mr. Jacobson, Plaintiffs' counsel instead called Mr. Jacobson threatening that they
would not allow the Sheriff's Sale to stand at $1,000.00.

From that point, nearly six (6) months

passed before Plaintiffs' counsel secured a "Stipulation" to Set Aside the Sheriff's Sale signed only
by Plaintiffs' counsel and counsel for Bonner County, Scott Bauer. No notice of hearing or
stipulation was sought from Mr. Jacobson, the third-party purchaser at the sale on June 2nd .
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The "Stipulation" was then submitted to the Court in late November, together with an
Order, and Mr. Jacobson received the Court's Order in early December, six (6) months after he
purchased the subject property at the Sheriffs Sale on June 2nd.l
The proper remedy to set aside a judicial sale, which has been
wrongfully made, prior to the execution of the sheriff s deed, is by
motion in the principle action. Notice of the motion should be
served upon the adverse party or upon the purchaser.
Wooddyv. Jamiso!!, 5 Idaho 466,50 P.1008 (1897)

Mr. Jacobson promptly acted in response to the improperly obtained Stipulation to Set

Aside Sheriffs Sale. Three (3) months then passed with, again, no action being taken by Plaintiffs.
Being unsuccessful in securing a deed from the Sheriff, Mr. Jacobson, through counsel, filed a
Motion to Issue Sheriff's Deed on April 16, 2010, noticing the matter for hearing. (R. pp.108-11O)
Not until April 21, 2010, and apparently in response to Jacobson's Motion to Issue Sheriffs Deed,
did the Plaintiffs fmally file their Motion to Set Aside Sheriff s Sale, which was granted by the
Court on May 19, 2010, and modified by the Court on Jacobson's Motion to Reconsider by the
Court's Memorandum Decision issued January 14,2011. (R.p.l21; pp.164-174)
Although the standard for relief is clear in Idaho case law, the Plaintiff s improperly gotten
"Stipulation" fails to even meet the standard. In Federal Land Bank of Spokane v. Curts, the Idaho
Supreme Court noted as follows:
As a general rule, mere inadequacy of consideration is not sufficient
grounds for setting aside a sheriff s sale, but it is uniformly held

1 The

property is less than twenty (20) acres and, therefore, the right of redemption is six (6)
months pursuant to Idaho Code § 11-402.
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that gross inadequacy of consideration coupled with very slight
additional circumstances, is sufficient.
Federal Land Bank of Spokane v. Curts,
45 Idaho 414,
262, P.877, 880-881 (1927)

Plaintiffs' Stipulation to Set Aside Sheriff's Sale presented no unusual circumstances to
justify the relief and was submitted at, or very near, the six (6) month redemption deadline. The
Plaintiffs' Stipulation alleges "for factual reasons that will remain undisclosed, the Bonner County
Sheriff's Department and the Plaintiffs hereby stipulate to set aside said sale", but ignores the
purchaser, Roy Jacobson, altogether.
The Plaintiffs then failed to timely bring their Motions to Set Aside the Sheriff's Sale and,
instead, waited until after the period for redemption had lapsed and after Jacobson sought relief
from the Court directing the issuance of a Sheriff's deed pursuant to the Sale ten (10) months prior.
Where a party is moving to set aside a sheriff's sale in equity, but provides no grounds for
their delay, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that granting such equitable relief "would do
violence to the general rule of equity that a party will not be permitted to benefit by or take
advantage of his own fault or neglect". Equitable Life v. Clapier, 121 Idaho 200, 203, 824 P.2d
131, 134 (App.l991); quoting Thiel v. Stradley, 118 Idaho 86, 88, 794 P.2d 1142, 1144 (1990).
The Trial Court seems to have lost sight of the Gaskill court's finding that a motion or
application to set aside a sheriff's sale must be made "promptly and without unreasonable delay", a
fmding which has been upheld in Equitable Life Insurance v. Clapier, 121 Idaho 200, 824 P.2d 131
(App.1991) [fmding that the motion filed eighteen (18) months after the date offoreclosure sale,
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and well after the one (l) year redemption period had expired, was untimely]. In this case, the
Plaintiffs were untimely in their Motions for relief from the Sheriff s Sale.
The Trial Court in its Memorandum Decision makes note that it is obligated to protect the
equitable rights of both the Plaintiff Creditor and the Defendant Debtor, Carol Blazier-Henry.
However, the Court fails to address why neither the Creditors nor Debtor failed to timely exercise
their right of redemption under Idaho Code § 11-402. The Record reflects that Plaintiff Creditors'
counsel, Arthur Bistline, did subsequently secure an Assignment from the Defendant Debtor of her
redemption rights, something that could easily have been accomplished at any time between June
2nd and late November.

Thereafter, the Plaintiff Creditors could have exercised the assigned

redemption rights by merely paying the sum of $1,000.00 together with interest, fees or costs
incurred by Mr. Jacobson. The Plaintiffs and Defendant did not do so and, therefore, they appear
before this Court without clean hands in their quest for equitable relief.
For the reasons set forth herein, this Court should reverse and remand the Trial Court's
ruling setting aside the Sheriff's Sale. On remand, this Court is asked to direct the Trial Court to
issue a Sheriff's Deed in favor of the third-party purchaser, Roy Jacobson.
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D.

Policy Considerations Require the Court Reverse the Trial Court's
Memorandum Decision

The Idaho Supreme Court, since Gaskill v. Neal, rejected a claim that a sheriff's sale is void
where notice of the sale was improperly given and the court reversed the lower court reinstating the
sheriff's sale to the third party purchaser quoting the California Supreme Court as follows:
Very few of those who become purchasers of land at sheriff's
sales, have an opportunity of knowing whether or not the law, with
respect to notice, has been strictly complied with, or whether the
defendants in execution have personal property at the time of the
levy, and if every mistake or neglect of duty, on the part of a
sheriff, would operate to invalidate such sale, great injury would
result, both to debtor and creditor, for no prudent man would give
a fair price for property, if he was liable to be divested of his title
by reason ofthe laches of the officer.
Nixon v. Triber, 100 Idaho 198,200,595
P.2d 1093, 1095 (1979); quoting
Smith v. Randall, 6 Cal. 47, 65 Am.Dec. 475 (1855)

While other factors were under consideration in the Nixon case, the court's policy warning
is sound advice. The effect of undoing a sheriff's sale will, ultimately, have a chilling affect upon
bidders like Mr. Jacobson who are willing to accept the many risks of purchasing at Sheriff's sales.
It is these bidders that ensure a fair and equitable sale process, that should be considered when

determining whether a to unsettle the process by setting aside a sheriff's sale. If the courts accept
the "shocking the conscience" standard adopted by the Trial Court, the Court not only punishes the
third party purchaser in the instant sale, but has a chilling effect upon third party purchasers in
subsequent sheriff's sales.
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Policy considerations of stability and certainty in the finality of the sheriff sale process
dictate that the Court reverse the Trial Court's ruling and remand with instructions directing that
the Court issue judgment in favor of Mr. Jacobson.
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E.

Jacobson Is Entitled To Attorneys' Fees And Costs On Appeal.

Idaho Code § 12-121 permits the award of fees and costs to a prevailing party on appeal
where the action is brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. Idaho
Code § 12-121 (2010).
To the extent permitted by the Idaho Appellate Rules and, specifically, Rules 40 and 41,
Appellant Jacobson requests an award of attorneys' fees and costs.
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IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in the Record and as set forth herein, this Court is respectfully

requested to reverse the Trial Court's findings set forth in the Memorandum Decision and to
remand this matter with instructions to the Trial Court to enter Judgment in favor of Appellant,
Roy Jacobson, specifically issuing a Deed to Mr. Jacobson as purchaser at the Sheriff's Sale on
June 2, 2009.
RESPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED this 27th day of December, 2011.

By~~~-=~____~~_________

BRENT C. FEATHERSTON
Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certifY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was delivered this 27th day of
December, 2011, to the following people in the manner indicated:

(Xj

Arthur M. Bistline, Esq.
1423 North Government Way
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83814

[
[
[
[
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U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Mail
Hand delivered
Facsimile No. (208) 665-7290
Other: _ _ _ _ _ _ __

